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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [UNOMIG](#) [UNSC](#) [RS](#) [GG](#)  
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA INSISTS ON NEW 'POLITICAL  
FRAMEWORK' FOR UN MISSION

Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY. Russian Permrep Churkin continued to resist substantive negotiations, on June 5, on a draft resolution to extend UNOMIG beyond June 15. Churkin insisted that Western partners needed to present a draft resolution within Moscow's preferred "political framework" before he would engage on the text. He made clear that such a framework would suggest that the Georgia conflict is resolved and that Russia was not a party to it. He said a resolution within this framework would also omit any reference to Georgia's territorial integrity and would not include Georgia within the name of the UN mission. Also on June 5, Russia presented the Quad with a concept paper on the security regime he wants included in the draft resolution. Georgian Permrep Lomaia told Ambassador DiCarlo on June 5 that Georgia is prepared to withhold consent to a UN mission if a SC resolution were to cross Georgian redlines. USUN will continue to engage with Western allies to plot a way forward, with the goal of achieving a substantive mandate and security regime that does not cross our redlines. END SUMMARY.

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Political Framework  
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2, (SBU) At a meeting of Permreps/Deputy Permreps from Croatia, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and United States on June 5, Russian Permrep Vitaly Churkin continued to resist negotiating the text of a German draft resolution extending the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), insisting instead that the current "political framework" for the resolution was unacceptable. Churkin emphasized that, "Moscow wants agreement on the political framework first-- if there is not clarity on the political framework, the rest is meaningless." During the meeting, Churkin resisted defining what he considers to be a reasonable political framework since, he said, he had already shared his views with Ambassdor Matussek. This statement prompted Matussek to run down a list of Russian concerns that included references to territorial integrity of Georgia, reference to Georgia in the name of the UN mission, language in the resolution which considers the conflict to be unresolved, language which suggests that Russia is a party to the conflict, and reference to a future UN presence in South Ossetia, references to the ICJ case or to the OSCE, and references to interethnic policing. Churkin agreed that those were some, but not all, of the Russian concerns. Churkin pointed out some paragraphs in the draft resolution that contained language that was unacceptable to Russia, though he still maintained he would not engage in detailed negotiations unless presented with a new draft.

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Security Regime  
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13. (SBU) Also on June 5, Russia presented to the Quad a concept paper on the security regime currently laid out in

OP3 of the German draft resolution. (USUN has passed this paper via email to IO/UNP.) The security regime proposed by Russia differs in several respects from the SYG's recommendations in paragraph 65 of his May 19 report. UN observers would be specifically tasked with observing compliance with the "Sarkozy-Medvedev" agreements of August 12 and September 8 under the security regime. It is not clear whether the ceasefire line --the Russian paper refers to the ceasefire line as a "border"-- would extend all the way along the administrative boundary to Russia, or whether it would extend only along the 80km ceasefire line of the former Moscow agreement. The security regime does not include extension of the restricted weapons zones or UN monitoring of the Upper Kodori Valley. Several other aspects of the security regime differ from the SYG's proposals.

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Georgian Views  
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14. (C) Separately on June 5, Ambassador DiCarlo updated Georgian Permrep Lomaia and Deputy Permrep Chikovani on the state of the negotiations. DiCarlo reinforced that the U.S. was being firm, despite Russia's intransigence. DiCarlo said that since we had not yet received any written proposals from Russia, it would be premature to judge them. However, she reinforced with Lomaia that it would be in Georgia's interest to have a security regime with international observers on the ground in order to monitor and report on Russian activities in the conflict zone. A continued UN mission, she said, would also make clear that the international community does not view the conflict as resolved.

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15. (C) Lomaia said he thought Georgia was unlikely to gain anything "on the ground" by having a UN mission, but could likely "lose something on paper." He added, "One more resolution that doesn't mention Georgia-- I don't think this is something we could live with." He emphasized that Georgia intended to stick to all of the redlines that had been outlined in a letter to Secretary Clinton, and that had been reinforced by Georgia in subsequent meetings in Tbilisi, Washington and New York. Georgia, he said, was prepared to withhold consent for the mission if Georgian redlines were not met. Ambassador DiCarlo told Lomaia frankly that it would be very difficult to get a direct reference to Georgia's territorial integrity in the next resolution-- one of Georgia's redlines-- since the last two resolutions (1839, 1866) had only referred to Georgia's territorial integrity indirectly, by reference to Resolution 1808.

16. (C) Lomaia wondered aloud whether a 6-month technical rollover might be an alternative to "killing the mission," since he thought the dynamics on the ground could change as a result of the developing U.S.-Russia relationship.

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Comment  
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17. (C) Permreps/Deputy Permreps from France, the U.K. and the U.S. plan to meet on Monday June 8 to plot a way forward, given significant Russian intransigence. We will also need to continue to engage closely with Georgia during the coming days. If we do break through the logjam with Russia and come to an agreement on a security regime and a mandate that does not cross our redlines, Georgia will need to be prepared to accept such an agreement.

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